When an author or authors demonstrate a thorough and unlikely knowledge of some part of history, the primary assumption as to the date of that work must be that, as a whole, it is no older than the historical events themselves. One may not depart from that assumption unless driven from it by the evidence. This is to say that the burden of proof rests entirely with those advocating an earlier date. This is an important rule of good reasoning, which I will now justify.
We have three possibilities: One, the work is indeed contemporary with the events in question. Two, the work's unlikely correspondence to the historical events in question is entirely a matter of chance. Three, the author or authors had some means for divining the future.
Case number one has the overwhelming track record, which justifies our rule above. It is our logical starting place. I am tempted to say that every single study, where a conclusion has been clearly established, favors case number one. However, we could generously allow the possibility of a few exceptions and still keep the above rule. It would be enough to establish that the great preponderance of studies favor case number one.
Case number two is very unlikely by definition. The rational mind does not choose the unlikely conclusion when a much more likely one is available. Remember, we are talking about a work whose details are such as to render historical coincidence extremely unlikely.
Case three, aside from an educated guess, not only lacks an established track record but also seems to be in violation of scientific principles! Certain predictions, such as the use of gunpowder and cannon, can hardly miss as long as a specific date is avoided. Also, if one sees the rising of a great military power nearby, it is not unreasonable to predict that it will soon conquer the entire region. Evidence of sufficient knowledge and reasonable extrapolations, then, are good reasons for waiving the above rule. However, since our interest is in those cases where knowledge and educated guesswork are ruled out beyond a reasonable doubt, we may move on to the miraculous claims.
Despite numerous claims of amazing, biblical prophecy, we have yet to find a single miraculous prophecy established with anything like scientific rigor. Careful investigation, so far, reveals either a vast amount of wishful thinking or, else, strong evidence of cheating. It is not just coincidence that the "best" biblical prophecies, those not held together by gobs of wishful thinking, appear to have been written after the fact. These limitations seem to apply to all miraculous prophecy (those that do not depend on rational calculation or reasonable coincidence). Similar observations apply to psychic, astrological, and other such methods for divining the future. Indeed, the vast majority of such methods are content to deal with some specific event and do not even attempt to summarize the hard, chronological details of some futuristic period. Therefore, case three (in the miraculous sense) has no track record at all -- not even to mention its poor track record.
Not only does miraculous prophecy lack a credible track record, but there are also no known mechanisms to support such prophecy. Worse, our current concept of reality seems to rule out such prophecy, except in a limited sense. The very concept of a fixed future (which might be divined in detail) was once justified by Newtonian physics. Its strict cause-and-effect chain of reasoning and exact, mathematical laws led one to believe that the future might be calculated to the last detail -- if one only had enough data and a sufficiently large computer. Those balmy days have long since given way to quantum mechanics, which destroys any notion of a fixed future. The future is always problematical, though some probabilities may be very high so as to give an outward appearance of certainty. Furthermore, the discovery of the true nature of chaos, which (aside from special cases) makes long- range weather prediction impossible, nixes even the Newtonian concept of calculating the future with certainty. To do so would require infinitely accurate data, which is not only impractical but also questionable in principle. Indeed, one may question the exacting nature of the Newtonian laws, themselves. Might not they be mere approximations that mask disorder on a small scale?
One may speculate that there exists a god with supernatural powers and a reality that allows a fixed future. Such a god might see the details of such a future, despite the above problems, and thus inspire his writers, but, that is pure speculation -- not established fact.
Obviously, case number one is the preferred explanation. The rational mind begins with the assumption that case number one is valid; it is the most probable by far, all things being equal. The rational mind does not abandon it unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary. To put it another way, those advocating another solution must rule out case number one. The burden of proof is on their shoulders. The rational mind does not reach for the improbable explanations until the more likely ones have been exhausted.
The ultimate error made by the Roger Hutchinsons and the Everette Hatchers of the world is that they argue for the improbable at the expense of the probable. They may assign a secondary meaning to a word or passage that is not justified, or they may conclude that a detailed knowledge of the future was prophetic without eliminating case number one. They err in thinking that their job is done if they can advance some scenario or quote some source to "prove" that their conclusion is not impossible. What they do not understand (or willfully ignore) is that they must eliminate the more probable explanations before getting into the less probable ones. The primary or face value of a word or passage must be eliminated before one can justify secondary meanings. Father and son mean just that if language is to be preserved -- unless there is compelling evidence that a secondary meaning was intended. Case number one must be eliminated before we can rationally conclude that Daniel lived in the time of Nebuchadnezzar and accurately predicted events in the time of Antiochus IV Epiphanes.
The one thing that Everette Hatcher has not done is to clearly eliminate the vastly more probable scenarios presented by Farrell Till and others. Hatcher must do more than cite alternative meanings or quote other apologists. In effect, he is bucking the odds and engaging in wishful thinking. Wishful thinking, of course, may occasionally lead to the correct answer, but whom are you going to depend on for dinner? Will it be the guy who fishes with a teaspoon or the guy who fishes with a net?
(Dave E. Matson, editor, The Oak Hill Free Press, P. O. Box
61274, Pasadena, CA 91116; e-mail, 103514.3640@compuserve. com)
