Many who read Bradford's article probably have only a vague idea of what he was trying to say, because he used a pseudoscientific approach to defend essentially the same position that Alex Donnelly argued in his letter printed in the March/April 2000 issue (p. 15). What Bradford was actually saying is that it is just as reasonable for Christians to believe in biblical miracles like the virgin birth and the resurrection of Jesus as it is for skeptics to believe that the world operates by consistent natural laws. Bradford's premise is that "the underlying cognitive processes used by most Christians and skeptics are effectively identical." What he is claiming is that both Bible believers and skeptics live by faith, and so the faith of the believer (based on his presupposition that "God" exists) is just as reasonable as the skeptics’ presupposition that the world operates by consistent natural laws. Bradford's position would be funny if Bible believers weren't so serious about this claim, which is being seen more and more in internet forums where Bible believers, apparently seeing the need to reconcile their beliefs with scientific realities, are desperately trying to convince skeptics that the faith of Bible believers is just as reasonable as the "faith" of skeptics.
Bruce Wildish's response to Donnelly's letter (pages 12-13, this issue) makes my task of replying to Bradford's article much easier, because Bradford's position on this issue is essentially the same as Donnelly's. I recommend that readers go to Wildish's letter and read it before continuing this article. The fact is that just about anything I say in rebuttal of Bradford's argument will simply be a repetition of what Wildish said in different words.
I find it difficult to believe that any Bible believer would think that his/her "cognitive processes" are "effectively identical" to those used by skeptics. This is not a denial that skeptics base their view of reality on presuppositions, because certainly they do, but theirs are, as Wildish pointed out, "empirically derived" presuppositions, whereas the presuppositions of Bible believers are based on nothing more than a desire for the Bible to be "true." The difference in the two is so "huge," as Wildish also said, that one would have to be incredibly naïve to claim that they are "effectively identical."
Bradford carefully avoided using any concrete examples to illustrate his position, and he probably did so because he recognizes how tenuous his position is, but those of his persuasion would argue that it is perfectly reasonable to believe that Jesus rose from the dead. All one has to do is presuppose the existence of "God,"and then it becomes reasonable to believe that Jesus rose from the dead by the power of this god. Well, yes, but all a Muslim has to do is presuppose the existence of Allah, and then it becomes reasonable to believe that Mohammed split the moon into two pieces, which is an event claimed in Muslim tradition and alluded to in the Qur'an (54:1), and all a Roman pagan had to do was presuppose the existence of the god Serapis, and then it became reasonable to believe that the emperor Vespasian healed a blind man and a man with a withered arm as reported by both Tacitus and Suetonius in their respective histories. Bible believers, however, know that they do not grant to other religionists the same right of "presupposition" as they claim for themselves. If an outrageous claim is in the Bible, biblicists will accept it and insist that it is entirely reasonable to presuppose the existence of a god who caused the event to happen, but if a comparable event is in another holy book or ancient document, they summarily reject it. Skeptics, on the other hand, would reject fabulous claims regardless of their source, because such claims have no empirically derived reasons to believe they actually happened. How then can Bradford say with a straight face that "the cognitive processes used by most Christians and skeptics are effectively identical"? The cognitive processes of Christians are based on flagrant special pleading; the cognitive processes of skeptics are based on empirical observation. There is a world of difference in the two.
A skeptic who believes that if he steps off a 500-foot cliff he
will fall to his death instead of floating in the air has made an
intelligent decision based on an empirically derived presupposition.
The Christian who believes that a dead man returned to life because of
the presupposition that a god exists who caused it to happen is really
engaging in wishful thinking, because he has no empirical reason to
think that it happened. The cognitive processes of Christians and
skeptics are about as "effectively identical" as daylight and dark.
