Reply to Donnelly...
I just wanted to take a moment to respond to the issues and questions you [Donnelly] raised with regard to my own recent article in your letter to The Skeptical Review (March/April 2001, p. 15). I see that Everette Hatcher has already made some attempt to address them, so I may cover some of the same ground here, but I wanted to respond personally to what you have said.
I think you misunderstand what is meant by the term "simplest" in contexts such as Occam's Razor. What Occam's Razor actually says is one should not needlessly multiply assumptions or engage in special pleading in order to resolve a question or explain a phenomenon. Put more simply, the best and "simplest" solution to a problem or explanation of a phenomenon is the one that does not require the investigator to assume the truth of certain hypotheses or conditions in order to make the explanation work. If some working assumptions are unavoidable, then the best and simplest explanation becomes the one that minimizes this to the greatest extent possible. In other words, the goal here should be to assume as little as possible and to explain as much as possible according to what we know from experience or can demonstrate through purely empirical means. An explanation that does not require the respondent to assume anything special in advance in order for the explanation to be effective is much better than one that does. The reason is obvious: every assumption introduces the possibility of error, i. e., mistaken assumptions, and each assumption just multiplies the possibility and degree of error. If you assume nothing but what you know to be true and reasonable from experience and observation, then you are far less likely to go wrong. Hence the simplest explanation in this sense is usually the right one.
How does this apply to Daniel and prophecy? We have here a text that shows very clear knowledge, at least in part of it, of events from the second century BCE. (We are speaking here mainly of chapters 7-12.) Right away then the simplest explanation for this is that the text postdates the events that it knows. It requires no special pleading or assumptions to argue that knowledge of events comes after the occurrence of the events. This is consistent with the daily experience of us all. None of us knows about events that have not yet happened. (We can exclude from consideration the claims of self-professed psychics to the contrary, for their claims have never stood up to critical scrutiny and their track record of success is abysmal and never rises above the level expected by chance guessing alone.)
On the other hand, claims of prophetic knowledge, i.e., knowing the future before it happens, are, by any reasonable definition, remarkable and immediately provoke one to skepticism. Why? Because such claims challenge our common sense experiences of the way in which the world works. This is why prophecy is considered miraculous. It challenges and even seems to openly violate our understanding of the way the world normally works. (I have no patience with people who insist that prophecy and other miraculous phenomenon are consistent with "their" perception of everyday reality.)
To accept, then, that the information about the second century BCE in Daniel is the result of prophecy, one has to buy into the assumption that prophecy as a phenomenon is real. The prophecy argument cannot work unless one accepts in advance the reality of prophecy as a phenomenon, but this is precisely the problem because this constitutes a dramatic example of special pleading and assumption- begging, the very thing that good arguments, according to Occam's Razor, must not do. By making this demand of us, this argument requires that we accept as a condition the reality of prophecy solely because the prophetic explanation of the content of Daniel just won't work unless we do! The circular nature of this kind of reasoning should be obvious.
Now some will argue that the assumption of the skeptic and rationalist that the world operates according to natural law is itself a presupposition that automatically excludes from consideration the miraculous. True. But–and this is huge–the assumptions of the skeptic and naturalist are empirically derived and common to the normal everyday experience of the vast majority of people. As I said above, it requires no special pleading or appeals to expect others to accept that the world behaves according to natural law in a logical, rational manner. We see and experience this fact every day of our lives. No one has to prove that the world is rational, follows laws, and behaves according to scientifically demonstrated principles. Only someone out of touch with reality would demand that one prove that the world behaves according to naturalistic principles. So the empirical basis of naturalistic assumptions needs no special defense. They are the obvious starting point of any rational inquiry.
Not so the presuppositions of the person of faith, who is assuming things that are not consistent with our empirically derived picture of the world and who appeal to that which is not seen or provable in order to make his case. The difference between the two sides here, and the reason why naturalistic assumptions are defensible while ones based on faith are not, should be readily obvious.
Therefore, your [Donnelly's] claim that the explanation that accepts biblical prophecy is simpler than the explanation that says that the work was written by a later writer who designed his work to look like an older one, is not valid. It engages in special pleading by requiring us to believe in prophecy– an untested, unverifiable phenomenon that cannot be accounted for scientifically or logically and whose validity can only be assumed through an act of faith. That rules out the prophetic argument as the simplest one. No explanation that appeals to the unseen and undemonstrable in order to work can be considered simple or superior, whether you are a person of faith or not.
The next thing that should be asked then is, "Does the explanation that the author of Daniel falsely attributed his work to an ancient sage require any special pleading of its own? " Does it require us to make any special assumptions? To believe in something that is not known to be true empirically?
The answer is no. The phenomenon of "pseudepigrapha," which literally means "fake authorship," was common to the ancient world and was very common to Jewish and Christian tradition. The phenomenon existed in all times, but really flourished as a literary practice between 200 BCE and 100 CE, the very period in which Daniel seems to have been written. We know of dozens of examples from Jewish tradition, and what is interesting is that the vast majority of them were books like Daniel– books with a strong interest in prophecy and eschatology. (A good collection of them is available in the two-volume set by James Charlesworth called The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha.)
So there is nothing at all unusual in the suggestion that the author of Daniel made use of this same literary practice common to his culture and day. In fact, everything about Daniel in terms of literary form and genre screams out the fact that it is a pseudepigraphic work. It is only by an act of will and ignorance that one denies the obvious connections.
No matter how you look at it, the easiest, simplest and most comprehensive explanation for the content of Daniel is that it is a second-century work.
I hope this helps explain my position better.
(Bruce Wildish, 2500 Harman Court, Mississauga, ON, Canada L5J 1T8; e-mail, wildish@interlog. com)
Editor's Note: This was a long letter, but it was well worth the space. Like Mr. Donnelly's letter, the article by Michael Bradford (pages 8-9, this issue) recycles the commonly heard fundamentalist claim that the presupposition that miracles like resurrections, virgin birth, prophecies, etc., happen is no more unreasonable than the naturalistic presuppositions of skeptics. Bruce Wildish has demolished this claim, so no additional comments from me are necessary. Wildish's letter has made my reply to Bradford (p. 9) a simpler task.
A reply to Hatcher...
Hatcher seems bewildered by the fact that I reject his thesis that Belshazzar was a real king. His wording suggests that we skeptics are a minority ("some critics") of diehard, dense holdouts ("still have a problem")! Let him name one, renown scholar, outside of those Bible-buddy apologists of his who have an obvious ax to grind, who endorses "Daniel's" account of Belshazzar. "Daniel" portrays him as the sole king, the son of Nebuchadrezzer, whose surprise overthrow during a banquet ended the Babylonian Empire. In fact, he was never "king," and he was not in charge when Babylon fell. Nor were the Babylonians taken by surprise at a night banquet! Several lost battles were fought in nearby cities, with Belshazzar heading up one of the armies, before Babylon peacefully capitulated. Even J. A. Montgomery, specifically cited by Hatcher, felt it necessary to qualify his conclusion with the phrase "in this respect." One is left wondering if Montgomery even accepted Hatcher's thesis.
What amazes me the most of all is that Hatcher quoted my letter (TSR, 10.1, p.15) without ever acknowledging (let alone addressing) its clear refutation of this thesis! If this is typical, then at least one great mystery has been solved; we now know how Hatcher can cite numerous, critical sources and still maintain his thesis!
Since there is no need for me to reinvent the wheel, I'll just cite a couple of passages in my letter:
"In 540 BCE Nabonidus returned from Tema to organize the defense of his kingdom. On April 4, 539 BCE, the New Year's Day Festival was properly celebrated once again. In that festival, the king put his hands in the hands of the god Marduk as a symbol of renewal. Only the king could perform this ceremony, which had been simply omitted during Nabonidus's 10- year absence. A clay tablet (ANET, 306-307) tells of the cancellation of that important ceremony when Nabonidus was away.... Thus, the Bible is in gross error on almost every point! Belshazzar was never a king as the Bible clearly claims that he was [let alone the sole king as implied by the context]. Belshazzar was not in command when Babylon fell, let alone surprised while feasting at night.He did not die by assassination but rather on the field of battle. Babylon, itself, peacefully surrendered, contrary to numerous horrid prophecies in the Bible. The kingdom of Babylon was not succeeded by a kingdom ruled by ‘Darius the Mede,’ about whom history knows nothing.
"The sources of the information above were Great Events From History, Frank Magill (editor); ‘Fall of Babylon,’ Ancient and Medieval Series, Vol. I, 1972, pp.179-183; History of the Persian Empire, A. T. Olmstead, 1948; An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament, Samuel R. Driver, 1957; and Anchor Bible, Book of Daniel [the recent edition]."
Note that only the king could conduct that ceremony; taking charge while the king is gone does not make one a king–no matter how much authority one received. Finally, various clay tablets always referred to Belshazzar as "the king's son" and never as "king." He may have been given the power of a king, in the absence of Nabonidus, but that obviously did not make him king. I am at a loss to understand Hatcher's bewilderment. I really am. These facts seem clear enough to me.
(Dave Matson, editor, The Oak Hill Free Press, P.O. Box 61274, Pasadena, CA 91116; e-mail 103514.3640@compuserve.com)
Knowing Jesus...
Please remove my name from your mailing list. Jesus is a wonderful saviour. I have known Him for 61 years. You can know him too.
(Glenn Woods, Sr., 169 Post Street, Sanger, CA 93657)
Editor's Note: I would really like for Mr. Woods to explain to me how he could possibly "know" someone who has been dead for almost 2,000 years and who, in fact, may never have lived at all. When I receive messages like this in my internet forum, I tell the correspondent that I am going to let a fictional Muslim friend, whom I call Abdul al-Samaadi, reply, and then I send a response like this.
"Muhammed is a wonderful prophet. I have known Him for 61 years. You can know him too."
I doubt that very many of the recipients get my point.
End of the ages...
I really appreciate The Skeptical Review. It is well written, and the logic is impeccable.My knowledge of the Bible is more or less superficial, and while I caught some of the problems on my own while reading it from end to end, most of them sailed right past me. I am of the belief that humanity really needs to shed this book they call the word of God and the fanaticism that comes with it.
While reading some of your articles on the web, I came across an interesting fact that you may or may not be aware of. In your article "When the Fig Tree Puts Forth Its Leaves," you quoted from Hebrews 9, which says that Christ had appeared "once at the end of the ages" to "put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself" (9:26). You went on to argue (and rightfully so in my opinion) that end of the ages meant the end of the world. The rest of the evidence presented certainly points that way.
Did you know that the KJV translates the "end of the ages" as "end of the world"? KJV Hebrews 9:26, "For then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the world: but now once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself."
For those who hold that only the KJV is the inspired true word of God, one has to wonder how these words (Heb. 9:26) can be overlooked. The author of Hebrews 9 states that Jesus could not have come earlier; otherwise, he would have to suffer again and again for our sins. He therefore came at the end of the world so that he would suffer only once. Hebrews 9:26 makes sense only if "end of the ages" means the end of the world; otherwise in the logic of the author, Jesus will have to come back and suffer again for our 2000 years of new sins. The author of Hebrews 9 thought that the end of the world was about to happen. How anybody can argue otherwise is beyond me.
One has to wonder what the translators of the KJV thought when they wrote this particular sentence.
(Joe Perluzzo, 51 Portsmouth, Pointe-Claire, PQ, Canada H9R- 5T4; e-mail: perl@cae.ca)
Editor's Note: Yes, I was aware that the KJV translated a Greek expression that literally meant "the end of the ages" as the end of the world. Although the KJV rendering isn't literal, it does capture the intended eschatological meaning of the expression. As noticed in the debate on the dating of Daniel, the author thought that the "time of the end" or "the last days" would come sometime during the Hellenistic period, and various New Testament passages show that the people of that period believed that they were living in the final age, after which the end of the world would come. In Matthew 24:29-34, the text we have been debating with Roger Hutchinson, Jesus stated rather clearly that he would come again during the lifetime of the generation he was speaking to, so to him and a "generation" expecting the imminent end of the world, that time was "the end of the ages." I say that Jesus said this rather clearly, but, of course, it wasn't said clearly enough to keep Hutchinson and his inerrantist cohorts from looking for a way to explain that Jesus didn't really mean what he plainly said. There are doomsday preachers all over the land today proclaiming that the end is near, so why should it be so hard to believe that preachers 2,000 years ago were proclaiming that the end of the ages was upon them?
Sacrifices in the wilderness?
The addition of "[just]" to the text of Jeremiah 7:22, is admittedly only one of numerous "corrections" to the text of the Old Testament by the NIV translators in order to minimize or eliminate discrepancies, errors, and contradictions from the Bible. However, in this particular case the "adjustment" is blatantly obvious because of other parallel statements in both the Old and the New Testaments, which were not similarly "tweaked." Roger Hutchinson might find it informative to take a look at Amos 5:25 and Acts 7:42-43, which impugn any notion that the Israelites were busy obeying all the dictates of the Law during the Wilderness years.
[Amos 5:25, NIV] "Did you bring me sacrifices and offerings forty years in the desert, O house of Israel?"
[Acts 7:42, NIV] "Did you bring me sacrifices and offerings forty years in the desert, O house of Israel?"
(Joseph Crea, P. O. Box 10576, Parker, FL 32404-1576; e-mail, Joseph.Crea@worldnet.att.net)
Editor's Note: Some biblicists will claim that Amos's question here was rhetorical. Did you bring me sacrifices and offerings forty years in the desert, O house of Israel? The answer was understood to be yes, but those offerings were no more acceptable to Yahweh than the ones the Israelites of Amos's time were offering, but Stephen, who was allegedly "full of the Holy Spirit" (7:55), applied it in a way that showed he thought that Israelite observance of sacrificial laws in the wilderness was at best lax.
Acts 7:38-43 He [Moses] is the one who was in the congregation in the wilderness with the angel who spoke to him at Mount Sinai, and with our ancestors; and he received living oracles to give to us. Our ancestors were unwilling to obey him; instead, they pushed him aside, and in their hearts they turned back to Egypt, saying to Aaron, "Make gods for us who will lead the way for us; as for this Moses who led us out from the land of Egypt, we do not know what has happened to him." At that time they made a calf, offered a sacrifice to the idol, and reveled in the works of their hands. But God turned away from them and handed them over to worship the host of heaven, as it is written in the book of the prophets: "Did you offer to me slain victims and sacrifices forty years in the wilderness, O house of Israel? No; you took along the tent of Moloch, and the star of your god Rephan, the images that you made to worship; so I will remove you beyond Babylon."
What would it take?
What would it take for me to believe in God? It would take evidence more believable than the best findings of science, findings confirmed (in some cases) by centuries of observation and rigorous testing. This is because the characteristics usually assigned to God are contrary to what we actually know about our universe. God thinks, but without a brain. God exists, but without a body. God lives, but is unchanging. Each of these qualities, and more, stands in direct contradiction to the reality we actually experience.
If God exists then almost everything we know about reality, the product of careful and intensive study, must be turned on its head. This is not a proposition to be taken lightly. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof! All the ordinary explanations must be ruled out with a high degree of confidence before we even think of concluding that God is the best explanation for something. The probable must be exhausted before we reach for the improbable.
To put it another way, the odds that we are dealing with a hoax, a misunderstanding, a self-delusion or any number of common explanations is vastly greater than the odds that basic scientific findings have been uprooted and overthrown before our very eyes.
When all reasonable possibilities have been exhausted, when it becomes clear that science can no longer explain the facts, only then is turning to the supernatural justified. Even then we could not know if we were dealing with a god, gods, a devil, or something else. Any conclusions about the supernatural realm are necessarily speculations. The rules of nature are the only rules we have to play with. Once they have been undermined, anything goes. Indeed, without the law of cause and effect, we would have no way of knowing whether a supernatural event even had a cause!
In short, if I detect intelligent, supernatural activity that clearly exceeds the known limits of science, which is in accord with the general concept of God, only then would I be willing to take seriously the claim that some kind of god exists. However, as noted, once we leave the scientific realm there are no known rules to guide us. Given general evidence for the supernatural, one supernatural conclusion seems to be just as good as another. Consequently, I could not be sure even then that I was dealing with "God." A specific belief in "God" would be possible for me only if God left a scientifically verifiable track record of deeds and communication over the years. In that case, God, whatever it might actually be, is effectively defined for us by that track record, and "God" could be believed with something approaching scientific rigor.
Please note that I'm talking about the general, western concept of God, not the "fundamentalist" view. The latter is tied to an inerrant Bible, and I don't see any hope for a satisfactory defense of the numerous contradictions, scientific blunders, moral errors, historical errors and other problems attached to the Bible. Those problems would have to be resolved–and I don't mean by wishful thinking–before I could be persuaded that a deity had anything to do with the Bible.
If anyone can demonstrate that physical reality (as defined by the laws of science) and Bible reality (as defined by the work of serious, mainstream Bible scholars over the last 200 years) can be stood on their heads in favor of your god, then I will admit that I was wrong. Logic and reason demand no less than that. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof.
(Dave E. Matson, P. O. Box 61274, Pasadena, CA 91116; e-mail 103514.3640@compuserve. com)
Editor's Note: Matson's comments remind me of the essay by the English poet Percy Shelley. Entitled "The Necessity of Atheism," it presented logical arguments for atheism, which resulted in Shelley's expulsion from the university he was attending at the time. (No one can accuse Christians of tolerance.) In it, Shelley wondered why, if he really does exist, God would not give the world some unequivocal demonstration of his existence. I have said before that if I were God, I would have settled the issue of my existence long ago. If I were God, I would consider David Matson to be as important as Abraham and drop in to chat with him too so that Matson would have no more reasons to doubt my existence.
Communism and atheism...
A few days ago, I received the March/April issue with further information about the book of Daniel. I consider it of the greatest interest and deserving the careful attention of every believer, not only of fundamentalists.
In the September/October 1999 issue you wrote that "communism is an economic/political ideology that has nothing to do with theism." It seems that you are wrong on this matter, since Lenin took for granted that any socialist had to be an atheist. His attacks on Lunacharski and Gorki, who tried to conciliate socialism and Christianity, were implacable. In 1905 Lenin wrote, "For us, ideological fight is not a private issue, but an issue of the whole party, of the whole proletariat.... Our propaganda includes obligatorily the propagation of atheism." I feel you and your readers will be interested in knowing it, so I trust you will publish this letter.
(Antonio Casao-Ibáñez, Apartado 882, 50080 Zaragoza, Spain)
Editor's Note: I see in Mr. Casao's letter
only
evidence that Lenin and his party leaders at the time were atheists.
However, to say that some communists were atheists, so communism
espouses atheism would be somewhat like saying that some Republican are
racists, so the Republican Party espouses racism. If atheism is an
official tenet of communism I am unaware of it. If there is such a
tenet in communism, I'd be glad to admit that I was mistaken.
